The Court of Appeal’s recent decision to dismiss Bersatu’s attempt to challenge Dewan Rakyat Speaker Tan Sri Johari Abdul should not be seen as a setback for democratic accountability — but as a reinforcement of parliamentary sovereignty and constitutional design.
At the heart of this case lies a fundamental question: Can the courts intervene in the internal workings of Parliament, particularly in decisions made by the Speaker regarding the controversial anti-party hopping law?
The answer, as reaffirmed by the Court of Appeal, is no.
Parliamentary Immunity Is Not a Loophole — It’s a Safeguard
Article 63(1) of the Federal Constitution is clear: the validity of any proceedings in either House of Parliament shall not be questioned in any court. This constitutional clause isn’t there to shield arbitrary decision-making — it exists to protect Parliament from judicial overreach and preserve the separation of powers.
Critics may argue that this grants the Speaker unchecked authority. But in reality, Speakers are still politically and institutionally accountable — through Parliament itself. If their actions are deemed inappropriate, there are mechanisms within the Dewan Rakyat to address it, including motions of censure or substantive parliamentary debates. Judicial review, in this context, is not only legally barred but also politically inappropriate.
The courts have now twice upheld this principle, first at the High Court and now at the appellate level. As Justice Che Mohd Ruzima Ghazali put it, the High Court judge was “not plainly wrong” in finding that the Speaker’s actions are immune from legal challenge.
Understanding Johari’s Decision: Constitutional, Not Convenient
Much of the public discourse surrounding this issue has focused on Speaker Johari’s refusal to vacate the seats of four MPs from Sabah — elected under Bersatu’s banner but later aligned with Gabungan Rakyat Sabah (GRS). Bersatu argues that this is a textbook case of party-hopping.
But Johari’s rationale was not without legal or constitutional merit. He interpreted Article 49A in its intended spirit — to prevent elected representatives from betraying the mandate of voters by switching political allegiances post-election. In this case, the MPs in question contested under the GRS umbrella — and the Speaker reasoned that their continued association with GRS did not constitute a defection to another party.
This is where the nuance lies. GRS, unlike more conventional parties, is a coalition — and at the time of GE15, Bersatu was part of it. After the election, political realignments within GRS and the status of Sabah Bersatu’s disassociation from the national party introduced ambiguity. It would have been overly rigid — and arguably unjust — for the Speaker to declare their seats vacant without recognizing the fluid and coalition-based nature of East Malaysian politics.
Johari’s Consistency on the Six MPs’ Case
Criticism intensified after Johari’s decision not to declare vacancies for six other MPs who had expressed support for the Prime Minister. Some claimed this undermines the anti-party hopping law, arguing that public declarations of allegiance should trigger Article 49A.
But once again, Johari took a principled and procedural stance: there was no written notification or formal declaration of party change submitted to Parliament. In his own words, “verbal support is one thing — without black-and-white confirmation, they remain opposition MPs.”
This may be frustrating to some, but it demonstrates consistency. Johari is not acting arbitrarily; he is applying a clear procedural threshold to assess whether a seat has been vacated — written proof, not just political sentiment.
The Bigger Picture: Reform Must Be Legislative, Not Judicial
The Speaker has become a convenient lightning rod in a broader political storm about party loyalty, reform credibility, and the health of Malaysia’s parliamentary democracy. But the real challenge lies not with the Speaker — it lies with the anti-hopping law itself.
Article 49A, though groundbreaking, is still a relatively blunt instrument. It needs refinement. Questions remain about what constitutes a party, how coalitions are defined, and whether internal party rules can trigger a casual vacancy. These are not questions for the judiciary to answer retroactively — they are for Parliament to clarify through further legislation.
Until then, the courts are right to resist being drawn into political territory they are constitutionally barred from entering. And the Speaker is right to exercise caution in interpreting a law that could, if mishandled, unjustly disenfranchise voters.
Conclusion: Upholding Institutions Over Politics
Tan Sri Johari Abdul may not please everyone with his rulings, but he has, in these instances, defended the integrity of his office and respected the constitutional boundaries placed upon it. In a time when public trust in institutions is fragile, such restraint should be acknowledged — not vilified.
The answer to political instability is not judicial intervention, but legislative clarity and political maturity. That burden lies with Parliament — not the courts, and not the Speaker alone.
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